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Abstract 
By 1998, about two-thirds of U.S. households held a bank-type credit card. Despite 
high interest rates, most revolve credit card debt. The majority of debt revolvers have 
substantial liquid assets, apparently violating arbitrage. We propose an “accountant-
shopper” model that could provide an explanation for this puzzle. In our model, the 
“accountant self” (or spouse) of the household can control the expenditures of the 
“shopper self” (or spouse) by limiting the purchases the shopper can make before 
encountering the credit limit. Since the card balance is used for control purposes, the 
accountant self may also find it optimal to save in lower-return riskless assets. Using 
attitudinal responses and demographic data from the pooled 1995 and 1998 Surveys 
of Consumer Finances, we estimate a bivariate probit model of the decisions to have a 
credit card and to revolve debt on it, allowing for sample selection. The pattern of 
estimated coefficients is consistent with debt revolvers being motivated primarily by 
self-control considerations rather than intertemporal consumption smoothing.  
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1. Introduction 
Credit card holding has increased steadily over the past 20 years. According to 
the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), in 1998 more than two-thirds of 
U.S. households had a bank-type credit card,
1 compared to only 43 percent in the 
1983 Survey. The majority of households with a bank-type credit card had not paid off 
their last credit card bill in full, and thus carried an outstanding balance--not including 
new charges--on that card at the time of the Survey interview. Slightly less than half 
of card holders declare that they do not usually pay off their credit card balance in full 
each month. Reported card debt is sizeable: among households revolving debt on 
bank-type credit cards, the median outstanding balance in 1998 was $1,800. The 
majority of households that revolve credit card debt report substantial liquid savings 
in checking, saving, and money market deposit accounts, with a median of $4,850.
2 
The median interest rate paid by such households on the card with the highest balance 
was 15 percent, far exceeding returns on their liquid assets. The puzzling portfolio 
behavior of revolvers of high-interest credit card debt who also save in low-interest 
liquid assets is the object of this paper. 
The limited research to date on borrowing behavior through credit cards has 
already identified three puzzles. An early puzzle is the use of high- rather than lower-
interest credit cards for borrowing (Ausubel, 1991), which he attributed mainly to 
failure of consumers to anticipate the likelihood that they will have to pay interest on 
outstanding credit card balances. Brito and Hartley (1995) argue that relatively small 
costs of arranging for other types of loans can induce rational individuals to borrow 
on high-interest credit cards.  
Gross and Souleles (2001) use a proprietary administrative data set of 
individual credit card accounts from different card issuers to estimate consumption 
responses to exogenous increases in credit lines and to changes in interest rates. 
  1Households differ in the extent to which they utilize the credit limit allowed by the 
card issuer. Grouping households according to utilization rates, Gross and Souleles 
remarkably find that households’ consumption response to an exogenous increase in 
the line is such as to return utilization near to its initial level in the space of five 
months or so. They also use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to document two 
credit card portfolio puzzles: the co-existence of credit card debt (i) with substantial 
holdings of illiquid assets for retirement, and (ii) with low-interest liquid assets. 
Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2000) deal with the former, which they 
termed the ‘Debt Puzzle’. They show that consumer preferences with hyperbolic 
discounting are consistent with the tendency of consumers to act impatiently when it 
comes to credit card borrowing but patiently when it comes to accumulation of 
illiquid assets for retirement.  
This paper deals with puzzle (ii), namely the co-existence of high-interest 
credit card debt and low-interest liquid assets, which is also documented in Bertaut 
and Starr McCluer (2001). We term this the ‘Puzzle of Debt Revolvers’. It constitutes 
an exceptionally difficult portfolio puzzle, as it seems to run contrary to one of the 
most fundamental notions in Economics and Finance, namely that of arbitrage.  
It would be problematic to attribute this tendency to lack of information or 
irrationality, since interest rates on credit cards and on liquid accounts are printed on 
the monthly statements and we show that this tendency characterizes a large segment 
of the population. Indeed, a recent Federal Reserve study finds that U.S. credit card 
holders are generally aware of the terms of borrowing on their credit cards (Durkin, 
2000). It may be argued that debt revolvers find it difficult to borrow in other ways 
and need liquid assets to cover contingencies for which credit cards are not accepted. 
Yet, it is always possible to obtain cash advances.
3 Revolving of debt is also not 
attributable to the use of automatic payment facilities: 98 percent of debt revolvers are 
  2presented monthly with the option to pay off their credit card debt and apparently 
make a conscious decision not to do so. Finally, hyperbolic discounting entails control 
of future selves, and this is accomplished by holding illiquid rather than liquid assets. 
Lehnert and Maki (2001) argue that a household that contemplates bankruptcy 
may run up unsecured debt and liquid assets, so that it can discharge a large part of 
unsecured debt (based on chapter 7 bankruptcy laws) but convert liquid assets to a 
bankruptcy-exempt asset category (like housing) once it declares bankruptcy. Using 
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, they find that households living in states 
with high bankruptcy exemption levels are 1 to 4.5 percentage points more likely to 
have both liquid assets and total unsecured debt in excess of a threshold ranging 
between $2,000 and $5,000 (in 1996 dollars).
4  
While strategic bankruptcy considerations may motivate the behavior of some 
debt revolvers, they alone seem unlikely to account for the widespread nature of this 
phenomenon, especially among households whose portfolios show no signs of 
financial distress. The data presented in this paper show that debt revolvers are 
widespread, especially in the middle class (i.e. households with incomes between 
$25,000 and $100,000). Indeed, among households with liquid assets in excess of 
credit card debt, only 14 percent meet the Lehnert-Maki amount requirements at the 
$3,000 threshold. 
5 Even if all of these were considered strategic defaulters, this 
would still leave 86 percent to be explained.  
We sketch a model of credit card behavior that abstracts from default motives 
and yet can generate co-existence of revolving card debt with holdings of liquid assets 
in the absence of financial distress. The model stresses that saving and consumption 
decisions, normally modeled as being simultaneous, cease to be so in the presence of 
credit cards. The decision of how much to save (or dissave) is assigned to the 
“accountant” or financial officer in the household, or more generally to the 
  3“accountant self” that pays bills and is in charge of finances. The shopper self uses the 
purchasing power offered by the available limit on the card to shop and determines 
the consumption level of the household, in a way not necessarily consistent with the 
preferences of the accountant or the financial constraints faced by the household. The 
accountant self, however, decides how much of the credit line to make available to the 
shopper self by making a payment into the credit card account. Manipulation of the 
size of this payment offers a way to the accountant self to exercise (shopper) self-
control and to limit credit card purchases. Since the revolving balance is now mainly 
an instrument of self-control rather than a means to borrow, it is no longer 
inconsistent with positive holdings of liquid assets.
6 We then examine 
econometrically whether available attitudinal responses and demographic data from 
the pooled 1995 and 1998 waves of the SCF provide empirical support to a self-
control explanation of credit card behavior.  
New information on attitudes of credit card holders in the 2001 Survey of 
Consumers shows that about forty percent of card holders perceive self-control 
problems emanating from the availability of credit cards and the possibility of 
overspending, though considerably fewer are willing to admit that this is a problem 
for themselves and not just for others (Durkin, 2002). Existing research in marketing 
and in consumer psychology stresses that self-control problems occur when the 
benefits of consumption arise earlier than the costs (Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991). 
This literature also points to evidence that liquidity enhances both the probability of 
making a purchase and the willingness to pay for a given item (see Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988; Prelec and Simester, 2001; Wertenbroch, 2002). Moreover, Soman and 
Cheema (2002) present experimental and survey evidence suggesting that consumers 
interpret their available credit lines as indications of future earnings potential and 
  4adjust their spending accordingly. Policy makers are also discovering the relevance of 
self-control considerations for savings decisions.
7 
Revolving credit card debt entails interest costs that we estimate below. Based 
on our findings, the costs paid by debt revolvers are neither negligible nor prohibitive 
as a means of imposing self-control in consumer spending. Costly self-rationing as a 
means of self-control may be a fairly novel concept in research on financial portfolios, 
but it has been stressed in Marketing and in economic research on mental accounting.
8 
A telling example refers to deadlines that various people, including academics, 
impose on themselves to avoid procrastination even when missing them entails 
substantial costs (Thaler, 1980; Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).  
Section 2 documents the characteristics of those who revolve credit card debt 
using the 1998 SCF. In Section 3, we present a model of credit card behavior in the 
absence of default motives, first without and then with self-control considerations. In 
Section 4, we investigate whether available survey data yield empirical support to a 
self-control explanation. Section 4.1 discusses what data are available and how 
bivariate probit estimation with sample selection can help differentiate self-control 
from intertemporal consumption smoothing interpretations of debt revolvers. Section 
4.2 presents estimation results, while section 4.3 checks robustness by focusing 
exclusively on debt revolvers who hold substantial liquid assets. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Revolvers of Credit Card Debt in the Data 
In this section, we document the puzzle using data on bank-type credit cards 
and household liquid assets from the 1998 SCF, the most recent and most 
comprehensive survey of household portfolios in the United States. We also review 
some potential explanations for the puzzling behavior of debt revolvers that are not 
borne out by the data (in the SCF or in other sources).  
  5In 1998, more than two-thirds of US households had a bank-type credit card. 
As indicated in the first column of Table 1, bank-type credit cards are more likely to 
be held by households with higher education, with higher income, by married couples, 
and by households who report their race and ethnic origin as white, non-Hispanic.  
Bank-type credit cards are held by a notably smaller fraction of households where the 
household head is either less than 35 years old or more than 65 years old.  As 
indicated in column 2 of Table 1, the majority of households that had a bank-type 
credit card had not paid off their last credit card bill in full.   
Although households that are younger, have lower education, or lower income 
are less likely to have credit cards, a higher percentage of those that do have cards use 
them as a source of revolving credit.  Some households may temporarily carry a 
balance because of special circumstances, while their normal practice is to pay off the 
balance in full.  The Survey does ask households about their normal card payment 
practices. Of households with a reported balance, only a little over 20 percent stated 
that they “almost always” pay off the balance in full, while almost half reported that 
they “hardly ever” do so.
9  As column 3 indicates, most households with a bank-type 
credit card typically do not pay off their card balances, and this is again more 
prevalent for households that are younger, have lower education, or lower income.          
Recent attention has been paid to the fraction of households with relatively 
high levels of credit card debt and the potential for such households to default on that 
debt by declaring personal bankruptcy (see Lehnert and Maki, 2001).  Data from the 
SCF confirms that some households do indeed have very high levels of credit card 
debt. However, there is a different, more prevalent, and puzzling feature of credit card 
borrowing:  nearly half of all credit card holders report that they do not typically pay 
off their credit card balances each month, while at the same time they hold ample 
amounts of liquid financial assets—assets held in banking, checking, and money 
  6market accounts that amount to more than half their average monthly income and are 
at least $500 (column 4).  This behavior is exhibited by all age groups, all education 
groups, and all income groups.  However, it is somewhat more common among 
younger households, among those with only a high school degree, or some college 
(but no college degree), and among households with incomes between $25,000 and 
$100,000 than for either low-income or high-income households. Thus, it tends to be 
a “middle-class” puzzle. 
One might suspect that this behavior, though puzzling, is mainly attributable 
to automatic payment facilities that allow households to make minimum payments on 
their credit card accounts without reviewing their balances every month. This 
suspicion is not confirmed by the data. Of the 2,664 households in the combined 
95/98 Surveys who had a balance on a credit card, only 51 used automatic payment 
facilities for any type of “irregular” payment, which includes credit card payments.  
Among those who usually have a balance, only 44 used such facilities. In both cases, 
98 percent of those who carry a balance on their credit card are presented monthly 
with the option to pay off their credit card debt and apparently make a conscious 
decision not to do so.  
Households appear to perceive self-control problems associated with holding a 
credit card. Although the majority of cardholders interviewed in the 2001 Survey of 
Consumers found that their credit cards made managing their personal finances easier 
by allowing flexibility in smoothing expenditure and repayment, 10 percent admitted 
that it was more difficult to manage their own finances.  The possibility of 
overspending and overextending financial resources was the most common reason 
noted. Cardholders were much more willing to admit that “others” faced such 
problems. When asked about whether credit cards make managing finances easier or 
more difficult “for others”, 40 percent responded that it made managing finances 
  7more difficult (Durkin, 2002).  Two factors may be creating these disparate views 
regarding personal financial management and financial management of others. First, 
these questions were asked only of card holders. A higher percentage for those having 
difficulty would be expected in the broader population of “others”, because this 
includes households who choose not to hold cards because of self-control problems.  
Additionally, households may be reluctant to admit their own self-control problems 
with regard to credit cards but more willing to identify the problem more generally.
10  
Skeptics may argue that households concerned about overspending could ask 
institutions to reduce their credit line instead of revolving costly debt. However, this 
seems to happen very rarely, if at all, in the data, and it is by no means clear that it 
would be an efficient way to handle self-control problems. Gross and Souleles (2001) 
track credit card accounts over time and report that only 10 percent of line changes 
are requested by the household, while in 90 percent of the cases it is the institution 
that initiates the line change. Moreover, households rarely ask for reductions, if at all, 
and institutions have been reluctant to reduce lines. As a result, line changes are 
generally nonnegative. Households with self-control problems do have the option not 
to hold any credit cards. Those who decide to hold credit cards probably do so not 
only for ease of transactions (which could alternatively be provided by a debit card or 
checks), but also because they value the ability to borrow for unforeseen 
contingencies without filing time-consuming and costly applications. Reducing the 
credit line and guaranteeing to pay off in full whatever the shopper charges on the 
credit card could severely limit the available buffer for unforeseen contingencies. 
Thus, limiting the credit line is not a costless way of enforcing self-control.  
How costly is the alternative of revolving credit card debt while holding liquid 
assets? This depends on the size of balances, liquid assets, and interest rates faced by 
debt revolvers (Table 2). Among households with balances on bank-type credit cards, 
  8the median outstanding balance in 1998 was $1,800 (col. 1). Households that typically 
carry credit card debt although they have ample amounts of readily available financial 
resources have similar or even slightly higher levels of credit card debt.  Columns 2 
and 3 of Table 2 show that the median level of bank-type card debt for these 
households was $1,900, while median liquid financial assets for this group were about 
twice this amount at $4,850.
11 Table 2 also shows the median levels of credit card 
debt by age, education, and income.  Both credit card debt and financial assets tend to 
increase with age (except for those aged over 65), and with income and education.  
Revolving credit card debt may entail negligible cost if interest rates charged 
on such debt are low, especially if the debt is financed at typical introductory “teaser” 
rates of 1 to 5 percent.  However, this is not the case for most households. Although a 
small fraction of debt revolvers with liquid assets do pay low interest rates on the card 
most frequently used, the median interest rate for these households was 15 percent 
(column 5).  
The next two columns provide an estimate of the interest cost to each 
household that habitually revolves credit card debt from not using available liquid 
assets to pay off the card balance. The first computes the minimum of two amounts, 
the card balance and the amount of liquid assets, and reports its median for each 
category. The second multiplies the minimum for each household by the interest rate 
the household faces on the card with the highest balance.
12 The median interest cost 
for the entire population is about two hundred dollars per annum, and it varies 
somewhat across demographic groups. On the whole, it is of the order of the cost of a 
DVD player per year. This is neither so low that households should not bother to 
eliminate it nor so high as to render it a prohibitively costly way of imposing self-
control. 
 
  93. The Model 
3.1 A Model of Credit Card Use 
Consider a household that maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility of 
consumption, possibly subject to nondiversifiable earnings risk. The household has 
access to two financial instruments: a riskless liquid asset that offers gross return Rt, 
and a credit card that allows the household to revolve credit up to a maximum level B  
at a gross real rate  . The rate   depends on whether the household has paid off its 
credit card balance in the previous month. If it has, then new purchases are given an 
interest-free grace period equal to one model time period ( ). If it has not, then 
the previous balance and new purchases are subject to the credit card rate, which is 
higher than that on the riskless liquid asset ( ). For simplicity, we will abstract 
from investment in illiquid assets and also assume that the household cannot borrow 
at all at the low riskless rate
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There is one consumption good, and it can be bought using a credit card. The 
household decides how much to consume in each period, C and how much of the 
outstanding credit card balance, Bt, to repay in period t by making a payment   
All variables are expressed in real terms. Given these assumptions, the household’s 
optimization problem can be written as follows: 
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0 ; 0 ; 0 0 0 = = = T B B A      (7) 
Equation (1) states that the objective of the household is to maximize expected 
lifetime utility over its lifetime of T periods without a bequest motive. Next period’s 
felicity is discounted relative to current period’s felicity, so that β  is less than unity. 
Equation (2) describes the evolution of the real stock of the liquid riskless asset. At 
the beginning of each period t, the household observes the stock of the liquid asset 
accumulated to date, receives labor income equal to Yt, and decides what part of the 
outstanding credit card balance to pay off using available cash on hand, At + Yt. Any 
remaining cash on hand is held in the liquid asset.
14  
Equation (3) describes the evolution of the outstanding credit card balance, B. 
The household starts period t with an accumulated credit card balance  It 
repays an amount   and it revolves the remaining balance,  augmented 
by new purchases, Ct, at a gross real rate   
. 0 ≥ t B





Expression (4) determines the relevant value of  If the payment does not 
cover the outstanding credit card balance (  the gross interest rate on credit 
card debt applies both to the inherited balance and to new purchases. If the household 
repays the outstanding balance so as not to revolve card debt   then new 
purchases, Ct, are given a grace period when no interest is charged and the gross 
interest rate is unity. If the household wants to use the credit card for purchases that 
exceed the entire credit limit, it can make a payment in excess of the outstanding 
balance   and take advantage of the grace period on new purchases. Because 
of the grace period, the household has no reason to pay for the consumption good 
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) ( t t B P >Item (5) lists the usual nonnegativity constraint for consumption, and the 
borrowing constraint that prevents households from borrowing at the low interest 
rate.
16 Relations (6) and (7) state that the credit limit on the card is B  and that the 
credit card will be taken away prior to the end of life. 
The maximum amount that can be spent on current consumption consists not 
only of ‘cash on hand’ (the sum of assets minus outstanding liabilities plus labor 
income) but also of the unused part of the credit line: 
) ( t t t t B B Y A X − + + ≡      (8) 
In view of (2) and (3), the transition equation for consumable resources is 
B Y R C P B R P Y A X t
c
t t t t t t t t t + + + − − − + = + + 1 1 ) ( ) (    (9) 
All terms are either given or exogenous to the household at time t, except for 
. Let us fix the consumption decision. Then, higher payments simply 
transfer mass from the first to the second parenthesis in (9). Now, given Bt, the choice 
of Pt determines   through (4). As long as the payment into the credit card account 
does not cover the full outstanding balance,   and the household increases 
future consumable resources by transferring funds from the liquid asset to the card 
account. Moreover, since both interest rates are riskless, this transfer constitutes a 
genuine arbitrage opportunity.
17 At  ,   jumps to unity and resources are 
further enhanced. Beyond this amount, arbitrage opportunities cease to exist: 
payments into the card account reduce consumable resources because  , and 
will be made only if optimal consumption exceeds the credit limit, 
t
c
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B .  
This simple result is the essence of the credit card puzzle and is not dependent 
on preference parameters or the earnings process. In view of arbitrage opportunities 
shown in (9), revolving credit card debt should not coexist with positive holdings of 
  12cash on hand, let alone with substantial holdings of liquid assets relative to its size, as 
documented in the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
 
3.2 A Model of Credit Card Use in an Accountant-Shopper Household 
Now suppose that the household consists of two units, an “accountant” and a 
“shopper”. The “accountant” is the member of the household who manages finances. 
The “shopper” visits the stores with credit card in hand. Note that the “accountant” is 
not necessarily the breadwinner in the family, nor even necessarily a different person 
from the shopper. Even a single person can behave differently when paying bills and 
when shopping at the store, and it is more general to think of the accountant and the 
shopper as two selves performing different tasks (hence the term “self-control”). The 
accountant self recognizes that the shopper self does not necessarily exhibit the same 
preferences or does not take into account the same constraints as the accountant self.  
The accountant self decides the size of payment to the credit card account, Pt.  
Given current cash on hand and the outstanding credit card balance, this determines 
both the amount to be kept in the form of liquid assets,   and the 
maximum amount that can currently be charged to the credit card for consumption 
purchases, 
, t t t P Y A − +
. t t P B B − −  
Although the accountant self ultimately derives utility from household 
consumption, it is the shopper self who visits the stores and undertakes consumption 
expenditures. The shopper self is told the available credit on the card account and 
decides how much to spend on consumption as a function of available credit.
18 Thus, 
the shopper determines the policy function  , where the constant 
credit limit 
) ( t t t t P B C C − =
B  has been suppressed.  
  13The accountant self can exercise shopper-self control by manipulating Pt and 
through it the amount of unused credit made available to the shopper.
19 The 
accountant’s problem can be expressed in the following way: 
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where   is the policy function for consumption chosen by the shopper, (2) 
is repeated for convenience, (3’) replaces (3), and (4)-(7) continue to hold as before. 
Denoting the accountant’s control variable, Bt – Pt, by ut, we can write the first order 
condition for the accountant’s choice as: 
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amount by which the shopper changes the current choice of consumption level when 
the accountant changes (infinitesimally) the unpaid credit-card balance. The resulting 
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the effects on next period’s discounted expected utility.  
Revolving a larger amount of debt into the next period imposes an interest cost 
equal to the differential   On the other hand, use of the credit card balance as a 
control mechanism reduces current consumption by 
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 This additional effect provides a way in 
  14which using the available credit as a self-control device can offset the arbitrage 
opportunities posed by the interest differential between liquid assets and credit cards.  
 
3.3 An Empirically Motivated Case of Shopper Behavior 
Once saving and consumption decisions have thus been separated, one can 
explore various cases of accountant-shopper combinations and interactions. In this 
section, we illustrate the potential of such setups to generate co-existence of revolving 
credit card debt and liquid assets through a simple example of infinite-horizon 
households and an empirically motivated assumption about shopper behavior.  
We assume that shoppers always purchase as much as they can without 
exceeding a target utilization rate for the credit card limit. Such behavior can be 
thought of as a rule of thumb, but can also arise optimally in the context of a 
homothetic, single-self, buffer-stock model (see Ludvigson, 1999).
20 This assumption 
is consistent with the empirical findings of Gross and Souleles (2001) based on a large 
proprietary data set of credit card holders, but somewhat exaggerates the speed with 
which households attain their target utilization rate. Although utilization rates differ 
across households in the Gross-Souleles data,
21 in each group defined with reference 
to utilization rates utilization returns back near its initial level in the “long run”. The 
time span involved is of the order of five months.  
If we denote the household-specific utilization rate by λ , then the shopper self 
purchases as much as is consistent with maintaining a revolving credit card balance 
. 1 0 , ≤ < ∀ = λ λ t B Bt      ( 1 1 )  
Given the transition equation (3) for the revolving credit card balance, the implied 













λ       ( 1 2 )  
  15Because the shopper self is consistent in following the simple rule of thumb, the 
accountant self can perfectly control the level of current consumption through the 
choice of the payment Pt into the credit card account. Note that Pt affects consumption 
not only directly but also by determining  , in a way given by (4). As long as the 
accountant chooses to revolve credit card debt ( ), the marginal propensity of 
the shopper to spend on consumption out of every extra dollar the accountant pays 
into the credit card account is equal to unity.  
c
t R
t t B P <
Using (12) to substitute marginal propensities to consume into the first order 
condition (10), we get 
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Τhis simplifies to 
[ 0 ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 = + − + t t t t R C U C U ] E β      ( 1 4 )  
This first order condition is identical to that governing accumulation of the liquid 
asset in the standard saving model without credit cards. The reason why can be 
understood by observing the nature of the accountant’s problem when the shopper 
follows this rule of thumb. The accountant’s problem now becomes: 
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where the function is given by (12) and the shopper’s rule of thumb has 
resulted in replacement of the transition equation (3’) with identity (3’’). The 
accountant’s choice of the payment amount Pt no longer influences the evolution of 
) ( t t P C
  16credit card debt but only consumption and accumulation of liquid assets, as in the 
standard saving model without credit cards. 
Intuitively, sacrificing one dollar of liquid assets to pay off a dollar of the 
credit card balance increases consumption by one dollar as in the standard saving 
model, but it does not result in lower credit card debt. In terms of equation (13), the 
interest savings from paying off one extra dollar of the outstanding balance are 
exactly offset by the interest charges on the extra dollar of consumption this induces. 
The only remaining effect is to forego the interest on liquid assets, Rt as would happen 
in a standard model of (liquid) asset accumulation. Since arbitrage cannot be effected, 
there is no reason why revolving credit card debt should be inconsistent with positive 
holdings of liquid assets.
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4. Is There Empirical Support for the Self-control Hypothesis? 
4.1  Making Use of Available Data 
Although the potential of self-control considerations for explaining credit card 
puzzles can be shown in the context of a theoretical model, probing household-level 
data for direct empirical support is subject to some limitations. An important obstacle 
is that self-control problems are largely unobservable, at least in the context of 
existing household surveys that also contain pertinent information on portfolios. For 
instance, while the Survey of Consumer Finances is the most comprehensive source 
on household portfolios and associated demographic characteristics, it contains little 
information on attitudes and habits that suggest directly either self-control problems 
or lack of concern for such issues. The limited number of pertinent variables of this 
sort can then be augmented with more standard demographic variables that contain a 
self-control aspect possibly in addition to other types of effects.  
  17We focus on three direct attitudinal questions in the SCF that seem pertinent to 
the issue at hand. Two of them ask, respectively, whether the household member in 
charge of finances (the “accountant” in our terminology) thinks it is acceptable to 
borrow in order to purchase fur and jewelry, and whether it is acceptable to borrow in 
order to cover living expenses. Controlling for other factors, positive answers to these 
questions suggest that the “accountant” perceives less of a need to exercise self-
control in credit card behavior. Additionally, the Survey identifies smokers, a habit 
that is known to be harmful but difficult to control for some individuals. To the extent 
that smoking is a signal of more general self-control problems, the smoker variable 
points to households that could benefit from costly self-control mechanisms such as 
revolving high-interest debt.  
In addition to the relatively scarce attitudinal questions, household surveys 
contain a wealth of demographic variables that can be shown to influence credit card 
behavior. Although we are not aware of existing psychological or economic literature 
that has established clear relationships between particular demographic characteristics 
and self-control problems, it is worth asking whether there are aspects of such 
demographic variables that are relevant for self-control and whether their overall 
effects on credit card behavior are consistent with those aspects. For example, 
attaining a college degree is often used as a signal of self-discipline as well as of 
increased understanding of financial matters. Being young implies that the household 
faces both bigger uncertainty regarding the future and a multitude of as yet 
unaccomplished objectives: self-control is important for the young on both counts. 
Although college education and young age can influence credit card behavior through 
various channels, it is interesting to see if their overall effect is consistent with what is 
implied by a model focusing on their self-control aspect rather than on a hypothesized 
need of credit card holders to borrow at high interest rates.  
  18Modeling econometrically the decision to revolve debt on the credit card is 
somewhat involved. Households may be observed to have no credit card balance 
because they choose not to carry a balance on their card, or because they do not have 
access to a credit card in the first place. Furthermore, these decisions are likely to be 
correlated. Unobservable household-specific factors that determine the desirability of 
having a credit card (and the likelihood of receiving a card upon application) are 
likely to influence also whether or not the household would wish to use the card as 
source of revolving credit.       
Specifically, we observe the dummy variable z1 = 0,1 for whether or not the 
household has at least one bank-type credit card.  For households that have credit 
cards, we observe (in our benchmark model) a second dummy variable z2 = 0,1 for 
whether the household had an outstanding balance on the card after the last monthly 
payment. We write the estimation model for each household i as  
1     z only when    observed   is   z  
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We estimate the decision to hold a credit card balance for households that 
have a bank-type credit card. As both of these variables are observed as 0,1 dummy 
variables, we estimate this as a bivariate probit with sample selection, allowing for 
correlation between the error terms u1 and u2. Estimation yields two sets of estimates: 
first, of factors influencing whether the household has a credit card, and second, of 
those determining whether it revolves credit card debt. The pattern of estimated 
coefficients across these two stages can help distinguish between two alternative 
hypotheses on why households end up revolving high-interest credit card debt.  
One hypothesis is that households revolve credit card debt as part of their 
effort to smooth consumption intertemporally. Under this hypothesis, households 
  19revolve such high-interest debt because it is difficult or costly for them to secure loans 
at more attractive interest rates. If this is the case, factors that encourage households 
to acquire credit cards should also make them more likely to use the cards for 
borrowing. Supply-side factors such as screening of applications would, if anything, 
reinforce such tendencies. It is not an objective of banks to discourage revolving of 
credit card debt once they have determined the credit limit. As Brito and Hartley 
(1995) put it, ‘[t]he most desirable customers are those who borrow a substantial 
amount on their cards and yet remain well within their credit limits and therefore are 
unlikely to default’ (p. 409).
23 
By contrast, the accountant-shopper self-control model implies that high-
interest credit card debt is revolved mainly as a self-control device rather than for 
consumption smoothing purposes. Under this hypothesis, we should observe a pattern 
of sign reversals across the two estimation stages: factors that make households less 
confident about their ability to control credit card spending should make them less 
likely to have a credit card, and more likely to revolve card debt once they acquire a 
card. These reversals should be observed even after controlling for difficulties that 
households encounter in securing other types of loans. As an additional check, factors 
that explicitly signal lack of self-control problems or of concern for such issues 
should not generate sign reversals. 
 
4.2  Estimation Results 
Our data set is the pooled samples of the 1995 and 1998 U.S. Surveys of Consumer 
Finances, the two most recent waves of the SCF. The pooled sample has 8,406 
observations, 6,906 of which have at least one bank-type credit card, and 2,664 of 
which carried an outstanding balance on their bank-type credit cards. In order to focus 
on households that usually rather than accidentally revolve credit card debt, we 
  20eliminate households responding that they always or almost always pay off their 
credit card bill. This leaves us with 2,013 households that usually revolve credit card 
debt. Variables are defined in the Data Appendix.
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The first node of the bivariate probit deals with whether the household has a 
bank-type credit card or not. The second, observed only for credit card holders, deals 
with the choice of whether to (usually) revolve credit card debt or not. Our estimates 
are reported in Table 3. Let us first examine the sign pattern of estimated coefficients 
across the two nodes for the three attitudinal variables mentioned in the previous 
subsection. The first two such variables are directly linked to borrowing for 
consumption. Controlling for various demographic characteristics that include age, 
education, income and non-liquid wealth, households that find it acceptable to borrow 
for fur and jewelry purchases are more likely to have a card and to usually revolve 
debt on it. The same holds for those that find it acceptable to borrow for living 
expenses. Households giving these responses are likely to be less concerned about 
exercising self-control in credit card behavior, and this is consistent with the observed 
absence of sign reversal implied by self-control considerations. On the other hand, 
being a smoker also has statistically significant effects for both nodes: it contributes 
negatively to having a credit card and positively to revolving credit card debt if the 
household has a card. This is what one would expect to find if smoking signals self-
control problems in other areas, such as credit card behavior, and the household uses 
the revolving balance to control credit card purchases.  
Let us now turn to demographic variables in Table 3. We first look at variables 
that make a household less likely to be holding a bank-type credit card but more likely 
to be revolving debt if it has one. Controlling for other factors, household heads under 
forty years are less likely to have credit cards and more likely to revolve credit card 
debt if they have a card. This is observed despite controlling for difficulties in 
  21securing other types of loans or credit lines through the liquidity constraints 
variable.
25 Young households have a number of future objectives related to 
homeownership and acquisition of assets and durable goods, and they face uncertainty 
about their long stream of future earnings. They thus have good reasons to be cautious 
in controlling their impulse spending, including credit card spending. Our finding is 
consistent with such considerations being important. 
Similarly, controlling for available resources and for difficulties in obtaining 
other types of loans, having more children makes a household less likely to have a 
credit card and more likely to revolve high-interest card debt if it does get a card. It 
seems plausible that an increase in the number of children makes it more difficult for 
a household to exercise full control of its credit card spending and our estimates are 
consistent with such factors being important.  
Households headed by a non-white or Hispanic person are less likely to have a 
bank-type credit card and more likely to revolve credit card debt, controlling for 
perceived borrowing constraints on other types of loans. If the financial services 
industry has made less of an effort to market itself to minority households, more 
limited familiarity with financial instruments or even some cultural predisposition 
against taking financial risks or losing control of credit card spending may be 
plausible explanations for this finding. In fact, this finding parallels findings in the 
stockholding literature that such groups have a more limited tendency to hold stocks, 
where no application or bank screening are involved (see, for example, Bertaut and 
Starr McCluer, 2001).
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Our estimate of Rho, the correlation between the error terms in the bivariate 
probit with selection, is significant and negative. This supports our findings of sign 
reversal between the influence of the same factor in the card holding and revolving 
decisions. It implies that unobserved household-specific characteristics that make a 
  22household less likely to hold a card also make it more likely to revolve debt on the 
card, thus reinforcing the role of observed characteristics consistent with a self-control 
explanation of debt revolvers. 
At the other end of the spectrum are factors that make household heads more 
confident or less concerned about their ability to control spending. Such factors 
should contribute to a tendency to apply for credit cards for the convenience they 
afford in making transactions, and discourage households from revolving debt as a 
disciplining device. Indeed, the most extreme way to impose self-control is not to 
apply for a credit card at all. College education and higher incomes, non-liquid 
financial wealth, and non-financial wealth fall in this category. The more educated are 
not only more knowledgeable about financial instruments but they also have 
demonstrated considerable self-discipline in meeting the challenges of college degree 
programs. For both reasons, they can be more confident about their ability to exercise 
self-control in their finances. This is demonstrated in credit card behavior here, but it 
is also corroborated by their greater tendency to absorb financial risk through 
stockholding (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). Education is not the only possible source 
of confidence. Those with higher incomes or assets can be more confident because 
they are financially successful, but also less concerned about going on a spending 
spree using a credit card. We find that all these factors make households more likely 
to have a credit card and less likely to be running a balance on it.
27 The SCF also 
identifies households whose average monthly expenses were below their incomes 
over the previous year and thus could afford to save (hence the label “saver” in Table 
3). The estimated sign pattern is the same for this variable that clearly signals reduced 
need to borrow as for education, income, and assets. 
  Marital status presents an interesting pattern of estimates. Being married 
makes it more likely that the household has a credit card, but it does not have a 
  23significant effect for whether the household revolves credit card balances. Married 
households see an advantage to having a credit card for transactions purposes, but do 
not regard marital status as a decisive factor for whether they will revolve debt. 
Rather than marital status being irrelevant for the decision to revolve debt, we 
consider it as giving rise to two conflicting (and apparently mutually offsetting) 
factors. The presence of a spouse may help control credit card spending, if spending 
by one spouse must be justified to the other or be consistent with some overall plan. 
On the other hand, having a spouse may create coordination problems between the 
two spouses. Based on our findings, these two considerations cancel each other out. 
Households headed by someone more than 65 years old are significantly less 
likely than their middle-aged counterparts to have a credit card and less likely to 
revolve debt. Findings in the consumption literature that older households tend to 
experience a downward shift in consumption suggest that old age contributes to a 
smaller propensity to undertake credit card transactions. This is probably reinforced 
by a cohort effect, given that the use of credit cards was not widespread through much 
of their working lifetime.  
Mainly for identification purposes, we also included in the first regression (left 
panel of Table 3) variables that proxy for regional factors likely to influence access to 
credit cards but are separate from individual characteristics that we do control for. 
These include the percentage of households in the census region
28 employed in 
finance, insurance, or real estate; the median net worth in the region, relative to the 
national median net worth; and median income, relative to national median income. 
The motivation for using such regional variables for identification is that there may be 
some tendency of banks to offer cards in regions that are more affluent or have a 
higher concentration of finance-related professionals. Of those variables, relative 
  24income of the region is strongly statistically significant, enhancing the probability of 
holding a credit card.  
  An important factor not present in the first estimation but only in the 
estimation regarding debt revolving is an SCF variable identifying households that are 
more financially alert, in the sense that they tend to shop around a lot for the best 
interest rates.  As seen in the right panel of Table 3, such households are less likely to 
be revolving credit card debt. Given that revolving credit card debt is costly, one 
would indeed expect those households to be more sensitive to the high interest rate 
charged to debt revolvers and to be less willing to use this mechanism in order to 
achieve other objectives, such as self-discipline in credit card spending. Incidentally, 
the finding that financially alert households are less likely to carry a balance tends to 
argue against the idea that revolving balances are mainly motivated by strategic 
bankruptcy motives. 
 
4.3 Focusing on Coexistence of Credit Card Debt with Substantial Liquid Assets 
  As a robustness check, this section re-estimates the bivariate probit focusing 
on households that not only revolve credit card debt but also hold substantial liquid 
assets that could be used to repay (at least part of) the debt. Specifically, we continue 
to require that credit card holders “usually” revolve credit card debt (in the sense 
defined above) but now we also require that they hold liquid assets at least equal to 
half their average monthly income and at least equal to $500. Although there is no 
generally agreed upon threshold for transactions balances, this amount combined with 
cash holdings that are not recorded in the SCF, should be sufficient to cover normal 
transactions needs. Households that satisfy these requirements represent about one 
half of households with an outstanding credit card balance and about sixty percent of 
those who do not usually pay off their credit card balance (see Table 4). 
  25Our discussion in the previous subsection is not materially altered when we 
confine attention to households that combine credit card debt with significant 
holdings of liquid assets. One difference is that households that find it acceptable to 
borrow in order to buy furs or jewelry or in order to cover living expenses are 
significantly more likely to be revolving credit card debt but not significantly more 
likely to be holding substantial liquid assets alongside credit card debt. If anything, 
this difference corroborates the self-control story, since such households do not 
perceive a need to exercise self-control by restricting the available credit card limit.  
Among demographic variables, young age (below 40 years) is replaced by low 
education (high school dropout) in the list of factors significantly discouraging 
households from having a credit card and encouraging them to revolve debt. Both 
young age and low education are factors a priori likely to be associated with self-
control problems, but low education is found to be more powerful when explaining 
the coexistence of credit card debt with substantial liquid assets controlling for the 
propensity to shop around for attractive interest rates. All in all, our conclusions carry 
through regardless of whether we investigate all those who revolve credit card debt or 
we confine attention to those who also hold substantial liquid assets. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Credit card usage by U.S. households has increased steadily over the past 20 
years, and by 1998, about two-thirds of U.S. households held a general-purpose bank-
type credit card. Most card holders carry an unpaid balance on their cards, and the 
majority of those hold substantial liquid assets at the same time. Because revolving 
credit card debt typically involves borrowing at an interest rate well above that earned 
by households on their riskless liquid assets, this portfolio puzzle is particularly 
intriguing, as it suggests violation of standard financial arbitrage. While strategic 
  26bankruptcy considerations may explain the behavior of some households, we find that 
this puzzling behavior is quite widespread, especially among the “middle class”. We 
present an alternative interpretation that does not rely on bankruptcy motives or 
financial distress.   
In our “accountant-shopper” model of household behavior, the presence of the 
credit card allows saving and consumption decisions to be separated. The financial 
accountant self of the household can impose control on the consumption decisions of 
the shopper self by revolving a balance on the card, limiting the amount of new 
purchases the shopper can make before encountering the card’s credit limit. Since the 
balance is used for control purposes in this framework, the accountant self may also 
find it optimal to save in a lower-return riskless asset to finance future consumption. 
Using data from the pooled 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances, we 
find that a number of factors make households less likely to hold a credit card but 
more likely to revolve debt once they have a card, and more likely to revolve small 
amounts relative to their liquid financial assets. This combination of findings is hard 
to explain by either a pressing need of households to borrow at high interest rates or 
by deliberate bank policy to reject such applicants. It is, however, consistent with a 
significant role for self-control considerations that tend to discourage households from 
applying for credit cards, and to encourage those who do get them to leave little room 
to their (other) selves to overspend. 
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  29Data Appendix 
Variable definitions from the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances 
Has a bank-type credit card: household has at least one general-purpose credit card 
(Visa/Mastercard/Discover/Optima) with a revolving credit feature. 
 
Has an outstanding balance on bank-type credit card debt: household had an 
outstanding balance after making the last payment (and not including any new 
charges) on a bank-type credit card.  
 
Does not usually pay off bank-type credit card balance in full each month:  
respondent stated that household paid off balances on bank-type credit cards in full 
only “sometimes” or “hardly ever.”  
  
Married:  includes both married couples and couples living together with shared 
finances. 
 
Kids:  number of children living at home, including step-children, adopted children, 
and foster children. 
 
Age variables: of household head.  Coded as less than 40, 40 to 64 (omitted dummy), 
and 65 or more.  
 
Education variables: of household head.  Coded as less than High School (no degree 
or equivalent), High School degree or equivalent but no college degree (omitted 
dummy), college degree or greater. 
 
Nonwhite or Hispanic: respondent identification of race and ethnic origin. 
  
Income:  income in previous year, from all sources, before taxes and other deductions.  
Dollar amounts converted to 1998 dollar equivalents using the annual consumer price 
index. 
 
Non-liquid financial assets: sum of total financial assets other than liquid assets 
including certificates of deposit, savings and other bonds, directly-held equities, 
mutual funds, retirement accounts, cash value life insurance polices, trusts and other 
managed accounts, and miscellaneous other financial assets. For the 1995 Survey 
respondents, dollar amounts converted to 1998 dollar equivalents using the annual 
consumer price index. 
 
Non-financial assets: current market value of primary residence, investment real 
estate, net equity in privately-owned businesses, and other non-financial assets 
including vehicles for personal use, artwork, antiques, jewelry, and valuable 
collections. For the 1995 Survey respondents, dollar amounts converted to 1998 dollar 
equivalents using the annual consumer price index. 
 
Self employed: household head’s occupation is classified as self employed. 
 
Not Working: Respondent is unemployed or not in labor force (other than retired). 
 
  30Liquidity constrained: households responding they were turned down for credit, who 
did not eventually get the amount they requested by reapplying, and those who did not 
apply for credit because they thought they would be turned down, excluding those 
households who were turned down for a credit card. 
 
Income low: household response to question whether income was unusually low 
compared to that expected in a normal year. 
 
Shop investment: households responding 4 or 5 to a question on the amount of 
shopping around for the best saving and investment terms it does, on a 1 to 5 scale, 
where 1= “no shopping”, 3= “moderate shopping”, 5= “a great deal of shopping”. 
 
Health fair or poor: respondent or spouse in fair or poor overall health. 
 
Probability stay at current address: household response to question on chance of 
staying at current address over next two years, on scale of 0 (no chance) to 100 
(absolutely certain to stay), with 50 = 50-50 chance. 
 
Has home equity: household has value of residences greater than outstanding amount 
of mortgage and home equity-line-of credit debt. 
 
D1998: household is from the 1998 wave of the Survey. 
 
OK Credit for Fur/Jewelry:  respondent stated that it is “all right for a person like 
yourself to borrow money to finance the purchase of a fur coat or jewelry.” 
 
OK Credit for Living expenses:  respondent stated that it is “all right for a person like 
yourself to borrow money to cover everyday living expenses.” 
 
Smoker:  household head is a smoker. 
 
Saver:  Household’s monthly expenses were less than income over the previous year. 
 
F.I.R.E. employment: percent of households in census region employed in finance, 
insurance, or real estate.  The census regions are: 
Northeast: New England Division (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT),  
Northeast: Middle Atlantic Division (NY, NJ, PA),  
South: South Atlantic Division: (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV),  
South: East South Central Division: (AL, KY, MS, TN),  
South: West South Central Division: (AR, LA, OK TX),  
Midwest: East North Central Division (IL, IN, MI OH WI),  
West North Central Division (IA, KS, MN, MO,NE, ND, SD),  
West: Mountain Division (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, UT, WY, NM), and  
West: Pacific Division (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA).   
 
Relative median net worth: household median net worth in census region, relative to 
national median net worth.  
 
Relative median income: household median income in census region, relative to 
national median income. 
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Table 1.  U.S. Household Ownership of Bank-Type Credit Cards and  
Outstanding Balances on Bank-Type Credit Cards 
1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances 
 
 







balance on card 
Who do not usually 
pay off credit card 
balance in full each 
month 
Who do not 
usually pay off 
credit card 
balance in full 
and have liquid 
financial assets > 
threshold* 
All Households  67.2  54.9  46.5  27.6 
By Age:        
Less than 35  57.9  71.5  60.7  31.4 
35 < 55  72.6  61.3  53.2  31.2 
55 < 65  75.4  49.6  39.6  28.8 
65 or greater  61.6  26.6  21.3  14.4 
By education:        
Less than high school  34.7  59.4  54.3  23.6 
High school diploma  62.8  57.2  50.8  27.6 
Some college  73.3  63.6  51.4  32.5 
College degree  88.2  48.2  39.6  26.4 
By income:        
Less than $10,000  24.5  62.4  52.5  23.8 
$10,000 < $25,000  50.8  55.9  47.6  28.8 
$25,000 < $50,000  72.8  58.0  51.4  27.8 
$50,000 < $100,000  89.5  56.5  46.7  30.6 
$100,000 or greater  97.6  37.0  28.5  18.6 
By sex and marital status:        
Single male  59.9  51.1  45.3  26.6 
Single female  52.3  56.0  49.5  28.6 
Married 76.1  55.2  45.7  27.5 
By race/ethnic origin:        
White non-Hispanic  81  52.0  44.1  27.0 
Other 49.6  70.4  59.7  30.9 
*Liquid financial assets of at least $500 and at least one-half total monthly income.  
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Table 2.  Median Levels of Bank-Type Credit Card Debt and Liquid Financial Assets of   
 U.S. Households Holding Outstanding Balances on Bank-Type Credit Cards  
1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances  
 
Card holders who do not usually pay off credit card balance in 
full and have liquid financial assets > threshold* 
   
Median debt  
on bank- 
type credit  
cards, for 
households 



















Min (card  







All Households  1800 1900  4850 15.0  1500 195 
By Age:           
Less than 35  1500  1200  3360  16.0  1100  150 
35 < 55  2000  2000  6100  14.0  1800  216 
55 < 65  2300  3100  4800  15.7  1900  220 
65 or greater  900  1000  3400  15.0  730  110 
By education:            
Less than high school  1300  900  3770  15.0  730  108 
High school 
diploma  1400 1100  3400 15.0  1050 120 
Some college  2000  2000  4000  15.0  1500  215 
College degree  2000  2400  6200  14.9  2000  258 
By income:            
Less than 
$10,000  800 800  1200  15.0 650 83 
$10,000< 25,000  1200  1100  2000  17.0  1000  130 
$25,000<$50,000 1700  1500  3770  15.0  1300  160 
$50,000<$100,000 2400  2500  6650  13.9  2500  270 
$100,000 or greater  3200  4500  11000  15.7  4500  509 
* Liquid financial assets of at least $500 and at least one-half total monthly income 
** Min(card balance, liquid financial assets) x (interest rate on card with highest balance) 
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Table 3.  Results from the Bivariate Probit of Bank-Type Credit Card Ownership and Whether 
Household Usually Has Outstanding Balance on Bank-Type Credit Cards 
U.S. Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1995 & 1998 
 Dependent  Variable: 
Has a Bank-Type Credit 
Card 
Dependent Variable: 
Does Not Usually Pay Off Balance 
on Bank-Type Credit Card 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant  -2.462 0.2225**  1.814  0.1913** 
Married  0.392 0.0584**  -0.016  0.0590 
Single female  0.121 0.0604*  0.071  0.0621 
Number of children  -0.078 0.0199**  0.091  0.0153** 
Nonwhite/Hispanic  -0.176 0.0489**  0.111  0.0441* 
Age Less than 40  -0.157 0.0477**  0.131  0.0400** 
Age greater than 65  -0.258 0.0573**  -0.644  0.0728** 
Less than HS education  -0.456 0.0525**  0.046  0.0705 
College degree  0.459 0.0498**  -0.258  0.0384** 
Log Income  0.123 0.0119**  -0.071  0.0126** 
Log Non-liquid fin. wealth  0.058 0.0045**  -0.045  0.0046** 
Log Non financial wealth  0.093 0.0062**  -0.055  0.0086** 
Self employed  0.022 0.0602  -0.190  0.0447** 
Not Working/Unempl.  -0.105 0.0849  -0.177  0.0855* 
OK credit fur/jewelry  0.255 0.0915**  0.246  0.0594** 
OK credit for living expenses  0.126 0.0410**  0.068  0.0348+ 
Smoker  -0.267 0.0448**  0.217  0.0406** 
Saver  0.132 0.0416**  -0.386  0.0369** 
Liquidity constrained  -0.343 0.0481**    
FIRE occupation  1.161 1.5552    
Relative median net worth  -0.046 0.0870    
Relative median income  0.620 0.2213**    
Income low      0.079 0.0448+ 
Shop Investment      -0.121 0.0347** 
Health fair/poor      -0.039 0.0431 
Has home equity      -0.003 0.0478 
Prob. Stay at address      0.000 0.0005 
D1998  -0.108 0.0411  0.074  0.0334* 
Rho  -0.702 0.1078** 
Log likelihood = -6033.97 
8,604 observations from the pooled 1995 & 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances for estimation of 
bank-type credit card ownership. 6,906 observations selected for estimation of who does not usually 
pay off outstanding balance on their bank-type credit card in full each month.  
**  Significant at 1 percent 
*    Significant at 5 percent 
+    Significant at 10 percent 
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Table 4.  Results from the Bivariate Probit of Bank-Type Credit Card and Whether Household 
Usually Has Outstanding Balance on Bank-Type Credit Cards and Has Liquid Assets Over 
Threshold, U.S. Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1995 & 1998 
  Dependent Variable: 
Has a Bank-Type Credit 
Card 
Dependent Variable: 
Does Not Usually Pay Off Balance 
on Bank-Type Credit Card 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Constant  -2.462 0.2148**  1.503  0.1861** 
Married  0.377 0.0576**  -0.128  0.0590* 
Single female  0.108 0.0597+  0.052  0.0629 
Number of children  -0.085 0.0195**  0.080  0.0162** 
Nonwhite/Hispanic  -0.162 0.0484**  0.100  0.0461* 
Age Less than 40  -0.140 0.0473**  0.035  0.0415 
Age greater than 65  -0.240 0.0568**  -0.387  0.0690** 
Less than HS education  -0.454 0.0522**  0.119  0.0702+ 
College degree  0.461 0.0491**  -0.189  0.0400** 
Log Income  0.121 0.0112**  -0.103  0.0121** 
Log Non-liquid fin. Wealth  0.058 0.0045**  -0.029  0.0051** 
Log Non financial wealth  0.092 0.0061**  -0.053  0.0091** 
Self employed  0.040 0.0594  -0.073  0.0457 
Not Working/Unempl.  -0.105 0.0851  -0.121  0.0902 
OK credit fur/jewelry  0.262 0.0875**  0.100  0.0618 
OK credit for living expenses  0.114 0.0406**  -0.047  0.0353 
Smoker  -0.279 0.0444**  0.126  0.0429** 
Saver  0.126 0.0412**  -0.161  0.0371** 
Liquidity constrained  -0.336 0.0462**    
FIRE occupation  1.721 1.4462    
Relative median net worth  -0.060 0.0821    
Relative median income  0.621 0.2090**    
Income low      0.082 0.0443+ 
Shop Investment      -0.047 0.0340 
Health fair/poor      -0.054 0.0427 
Has home equity      0.032 0.0472 
Prob. Stay at address      0.000 0.0005 
D1998  -0.112 0.0405**  0.144  0.0345** 
Rho  -0.840 0.0615** 
Log likelihood = -5413.76 
8,604 observations from the pooled 1995 & 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances for estimation of 
bank-type credit card ownership. 6,906 observations selected for estimation of who does not usually 
pay off outstanding balance on their bank-type credit card in full each month and has liquid assets over 
threshold amount. 
**  Significant at 1 percent 
*    Significant at 5 percent 
+    Significant at 10 percent 
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Endnotes 
 
1 A bank-type credit card is a credit card that is not restricted to use at a particular store chain 
and that can be used readily as a source of revolving credit. 
2 Specifically, 27.6 percent of bank-type card holders do not usually pay off their credit card 
balance in full and have liquid financial assets at least equal to one-half of their total monthly income 
and of an amount no less than $500. 
3 Indeed, the model of Brito and Hartley (1995) contains costs of obtaining other loans but 
stresses the role of credit card balances in economizing on holdings of liquid assets for precautionary 
purposes. 
4 Depending on the threshold, between 8 and 21 percent of homeowners and between 3 and 9 
percent of renters fall into this category. 
5 In our calculations, we have included households revolving debt on bank-type credit cards in 
excess of $2,500 and liquid assets in excess of $3,000. These restrictions yield similar demographics as 
requiring $3000 of total unsecured debt and liquid assets in excess of $3,000.  Reducing the threshold 
to $2,000 raises the fraction of SCF households that “borrow to save” to about 24 percent, while raising 
it to $5,000 reduces the fraction to 5 percent. 
6 This should be differentiated from a self-control model based on hyperbolic discounting, as 
in Laibson et al. (2000). Under hyperbolic discounting, different selves are temporally separated rather 
than contemporaneous; (credit card) borrowing is undertaken for intertemporal consumption smoothing 
rather than for control; and the control function is assigned to assets that need to be sufficiently illiquid 
in order to be available to influence behavior of future selves. Laibson et al. explicitly state that their 
model is not designed to handle the puzzle of liquid asset holdings. Gross and Souleles (2001) share 
this view and independently mention in passing that the current puzzle could perhaps be solved by 
models in which agents undertake costly actions (such as revolving debt) to limit their impulse 
spending. 
7 “Clearly, neoclassical economics, with its strong assumptions about rational decision-
making, provides a helpful theoretical framework, but we will also need to rely on other models and 
frameworks to help us better understand how people process information and make decisions. The 
work of economists such as Richard Thaler on the benefits of "low-willpower" techniques to increase 
savings is an example in this regard.” Remarks by Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. before the National Council on Economic Education, 
Washington, D.C., May 13, 2002. 
8 Anecdotal evidence on precommitment and self-rationing is abundant (see, for example, 
Hoch and Loewenstein, 1991; Schelling, 1992; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981, and Wertenbroch, 2002). 
Serious self-control problems are difficult to observe under controlled conditions, and therefore 
controlled empirical evidence on self-rationing is only now beginning to emerge (see, Wertenbroch, 
1998; Soman and Cheema, 2002). For example, consumers have been observed to purchase small and 
more expensive packs of cigarettes rather than cartons, so as to discourage themselves from smoking 
too much. 
9 Using data from special waves of the Surveys of Consumers for 1999 and 2000, Durkin 
(2000) finds a slightly higher percentage of credit card holders report “hardly ever” paying off their 
balance than in the 1998 SCF.   
10 Lack of willingness to admit problems with handling credit cards has already been noted in 
the literature in a different context. Using data sources other than the SCF, Gross and Souleles (2001) 
and Laibson et al. (2000) have noted an apparent understatement of credit card balances in household 
responses in the SCF, probably reflecting reluctance on the part of card holders to admit the extent of 
card indebtedness.  
11 When the definition of assets is expanded to include a broader definition of safe investment 
assets (also including bank certificates of deposit, cash value life insurance policies, and riskless assets 
held in retirement accounts), the puzzle is even more apparent. The median amount of safe financial 
assets for these households was over $8,000, more than five times their credit card debt.    
12 The interest cost to maintaining both credit card debt and liquid financial assets should 
reflect the interest rate spread between interest charged on the card debt and interest earned on assets. 
 However, for the majority of these households, these assets are held primarily in non-interest-earning 
checking accounts. 
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13 This is the practice followed in many dynamic models of consumption behavior with 
liquidity constraints. A more complicated alternative is to allow for forms of borrowing in addition to 
the credit card that entail higher transactions costs.  
14 The assumption that liquid assets will not be used directly for purchases of the consumption 
good is not restrictive, as will be seen shortly. 
15 The household has an incentive to pay into the credit card account as much as it takes to pay 
off the outstanding balance, since this ensures that new credit card purchases are subject to the grace 
period. If its optimal payment either falls short of or exceeds the outstanding balance, then the 
household is indifferent between using the credit card or liquid assets to purchase the consumption 
good, because the interest cost of new purchases is the same between these two options.  
16 Although this borrowing constraint is extensively used in the saving literature, it is not 
essential to the argument in this paper, since we are mainly interested in households with positive 
liquid assets. 
17 Traditionally, arbitrage refers to interest gains from borrowing at a low riskless rate to 
invest at a higher rate without risk. In our case, it refers to interest savings: the agent considers 
lowering investment in the low-rate asset in order to lower borrowing at the high rate that has been 
undertaken for other reasons. 
18 As in the previous model, this can exceed the size of the credit line,   if the accountant 
has decided to make a payment in excess of the accumulated balance. 
, B
0 ≥ t P
19 Notice that if the policy rule followed by the shopper is known to the accountant or can be 
inferred from the shopper’s actions, then the accountant can achieve perfect control of the current 
household consumption level, conditional on the state in period t.  Even in this case, however, the 
accountant does not control the entire consumption path. This is because , and the accountant 
can at best restrict consumption in the first period C0 to be no more than the credit card limit. 
20 In such a model, the optimal buffer of unused credit is a constant fraction of the available 
credit limit. For a comparison of rules of thumb and optimal behavior in buffer-stock models, see Allen 
and Carroll (2000). 
21 Gross and Souleles (2001) find that almost 14 percent of their sample have credit card 
utilization rates, defined as the ratio of card balance to credit limit, above 90 percent. The proportion of 
households displaying utilization rates above 90 percent is higher among younger rather than older 
households, among those with low rather than high income, and those with small rather than large 
credit limits. Demographic groups are obtained by splitting the sample at (about) the median level of 
the relevant characteristic (i.e., age, income, credit limit respectively). 
22 Note that the model does not imply that the household will necessarily choose to revolve 
credit card debt. For example, if the accountant is happy to consume  , then the balance will be paid 
off resulting in consumption of   according to (12). More generally, in periods in which the 
accountant’s desired consumption level is no less than that of the shopper, there is no need to control 




23 If fear of default is indeed a major motivating factor for banks in screening applicants, then 
supply-side factors may contribute to making credit card holding less pronounced among demographic 
groups likely to borrow large amounts. The role of such factors, however, seems to have been 
weakened in the 1990s with the advent of better credit scoring methods, enabling card issuers to offer 
cards at varying interest rates depending on assessment of credit risk. In fact, households that 
previously may have been considered more likely to default account for the largest percentage increase 
in card ownership in the 1990s. From 1977 to 1989, bank-type card ownership among U.S. households 
increased by 18 percentage points, from 38 percent to 56 percent, with the largest percentage increases 
occurring in the middle and top two income quintiles.  From 1989 to 1998, however, card ownership 
for all households increased another 12 percentage points to 68 percent.  The increase was most 
dramatic for households in the second lowest income quintile (22 percentage points, from 36 percent 
ownership to 58 percent ownership). For further details, see Durkin (2000). 
24 One variable we do not have access to in the public use Surveys of Consumer Finances is 
information on the state of residence of the household. 
25 The liquidity constraints dummy excludes households who said they had been turned down 
or not received credit desired for a credit card.  
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26 If the variable on liquidity constraints as perceived by the households fails to capture the 
particular difficulties of minority households to secure loans (e.g., because they were not targeted by 
the financial services industry), then the race and ethnic origin dummy may be capturing difficulties as 
reflected in credit card applications in the first stage, and then a stronger tendency of minorities to 
borrow on the credit card because they are unable to secure low-interest loans. 
27 It is conceivable that targeting of educated and well-to-do households by credit card 
companies may contribute to the finding that such households are more likely to hold a card. However, 
it should be noted that some providers of consumer credit reveal that the level of income itself in not 
used as a criterion for approval. Moreover, it is unlikely that companies target educated or well-to-do 
households  because they are less likely to borrow. The latter is probably a consequence of their 
reduced need to rely on revolving credit card debt as a method of self-control, combined with their 
ability to use cheaper forms of credit. 
28 Census regions are defined in the Data Appendix. 
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